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T axing Trademarks and Domain N ames 
Xuan-Thao Nguyen and j effrey A. Maine* 
In 2006, the top global trademarks or brands include household na mes across 
geographical borders. Coca-Cola lead s the pack with a trademark valuation of 
$67 billion. Other leaders include: M icrosoft-$60 billion; IBM-$56 bmion; 
GE-$49 billion; Intel-$32 billion; Nokia - $30 billion; T oyota - $28 bill ion; 
and McDonald's-$27.5 billion. The Coogle brand leads global brands in the 
online business with a val uation of $12.4 b illion, an increase of46 percent from 
2005. These nu mbers reflect how valua ble trademarks as corporate assets are. 
Acquisitions of trademarks, e ither separately or togethe r with ongoing b usiness 
concerns, are governed by spec ific tax rules providing needed certainty to both 
the sellers and the purchasers. 
With the arrival ofglobal electronic commerce transactions on the Internet, 
n.ew forms of intel1ectual property rights, such as Internet domain names, have 
emerged. Today, Internet domain names are some companies' most valuable 
assets. Yet law p rofessors, attorneys, an d judges struggle with the legal nature of 
domain n ames, wh ich is far from settled. Q u estions draWing recent attention 
include: How sh ould domain names be valued?1 Can domain na mes be used as 
collateral in sec ured tran sactions, and how does on e perfect a securily interest in 
domain names?2 What will h appen to domain names in bankruptcy?3 
Another puzzl ing q uestion, which has received little attention, is how should 
domain names be treated for federal tax purposes? Although there are tax rules 
governing traditional intellectual property rights, such as trademarks and trade 
names, there are no rules dealing specilically with domain names. Thjs chapter 
addresses these parallel questions: Are domain names merely variations of tra­
ditional forms of intellectual property and other intangible rights to wh ich the 
* Copyright© 2006 Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine. Th is chapter was adapted from Xuan­
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1(2004). 
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existing tax regime can be applied? Or are domain names new intangible rights 
that need thei r own set of tax laws? 
Current, albeit arbitrary, rules exis t governing the tax treatment of trad itional 
forms of intellectual property.4 Under present law, for example, the costs of 
building goodwill in a trademark or trade name are immediately deductible. 5 In 
contrast, the costs of purchasing a company's trademark, trade name, or goodwill 
are not immediately d eductible but must be recovered over an arbitrary fiftee n­
year p eriod.6 While tax principles exist for these traditional intellectual property 
and intangible rights, specific tax rules do no t exist for new intellectual prop­
erty rights, such as domain na mes, that are emerging with the arrival of global 
electron ic commerce transactions on the In ternet. 
This chapter explores the proper tax treatment ofdomain name acquisition 
costs.' It begins by explaining the rise of valuable domain names as a new in­
tell ectual property right having u ncertain tax consequences. The next section 
analyzes the historical and current tax rules governing trademarks, trade names, 
and goodwill. T h e chapter then exam ines the legal nature of domain names to 
determine whether they can read ily fit within the current tax regime for intan­
gible rights. The section explores, speci fically, whether domain names should 
be treated for tax p u rposes as trademarks or goodwill. The chapter concludes 
that doma in nam es that function as source identifiers sh ould b e treated u nder 
the current tax regime applicable to trademarks, so that costs of acq uiring such 
domain names sh ould be recove red ratably over fifteen years. Generic domain 
names, in contrast, possess "inherent" goodwill not dealt with by the existing 
intangible tax regime. The disparate treatment between domain names functio n­
ing as source identifiers and generic domain names illustrates the inadequacies 
of tax: law in dealing 'vi th the expansion of intellectual property rights for ex­
isting intangible assets as well as the emergence of n ew intellectual property 
righ ts. This section criticizes the ad hoc response by administrative tax agen­
cies in deal ing with cyber-assets, and calls for Congress to revisit the current tax 
regime for intangibles. With the increase ofglobal , electron ic commerce transac- · 
tions on the In ternet, the nature of cyberspace will undoubtedly requ ire new tiX: 
rules. 
RISE OF A NEW INTEllECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT HAVING UNCERTAIN 
TAX CONSEQUENCES 
Rise of Domain Names as Valuable Cyber-assets 
The explosive growth of the Inte rnet in recent years h as provided a new 
medium for electronic commerce and communication across national border~ ;~ 
This network conn ects computers arou nd the world, fac ili tates cha nges in 
technology,9 and allows different forms ofcomme rce su ch as BZB,10 BZC,11 and 
CZC12 to emerge. Despite the recent economic downturn and the "dotcom" 
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bubble bursting, the Internet continues to be a critical component of daily life 
and commerce.B As of June 2006, the three leading languages "spoken" on the 
Internet are E nglish, Chinese, and Japanese, 14 and 1.04 billion people connected 
to th e global network. 15 Businesses and consumers use the Internet to conduct 
businesses, communicate, research , and exchange information. 
The arrival and explosive growth ofa networking medium has facilitated the 
genesis of a new form of cyber-asset, the domain name. A company must h ave 
a Web site and domai n name to provide information, communication, goods, 
or services online.16 Many Internet companies, unlike traditional companies, 
own mostly intangible assets such as business know-how, Web pages, copyrights, 
databases, trademarks, and domain names. 17 Domain names can be the name 
of the company itself or the name of a b rand, product, or service.18 The more 
recognizable the domain name, the more value it has in the online market. 
For exa).Tiple, <business.com> was sold for $7.5 million ,19 <loans.com> for 
$3 mill ion , <wine.com> for $3 million,20 <autos.com> for $2.2 million,21 
and <men.com> for $1.3 million.22 Offers reached eigh t m illion dollars for 
<cool.com >, and ten million dollars for <america.com>. 23 
Some Internet compan ies have been willing to spend a large amount of 
money for a memorable, easy-to-type domain name, because the name h elps 
increase traffic to their Web sites.24 Internet users often search for a company, 
product, or service by typing a domain name address in a location bar or entering 
key words in a search engine. A memorable and easy-to-type domain name will 
attra.ct more visitors than a long, complicated, or cumbersome domain name. 
For example, <loans.com> received more than 3,000 visitors a day even though 
there were rro active Web pages connected to the domain name.25 Bank of 
America understood how users search for information, products, and services on 
the Internet, so the company did not hesitate to purchase a domain name for the 
high-ticket price ofthree million dollars. 26 
T o establish a presence on the Internet, a company must distingu ish itself 
among the vast network of Web sitesP One way to do this is to possess a mem­
orable domain name that appeals to customers much like a brand name. 28 This 
realization has led to speculation in domain name values in recent years. A no­
table case showing the effect speculation can have on a domain n ame's value is 
<sex.com>, which was reportedly worth as much as $250 rnillion.29 
One of the reasons for the spectacular rise in domain name v~lues is the 
scarcity problem.3° Another r-eason is the structure ofthe domain name assigning 
system. As described in an earlier chapter, top-Level-Domain ("TLD") names 
(<.com>, <.net>, and <.org>) are assigned on a first-come, first-served basis.31 
Domain names are designed to make the Internet friendly to use, by replacing 
hard-to-remember Internet Protocol numbers with mnemonic namesY Each 
computer or host on the Internet has an Internet Protocol add ress composed ·of 
a long string of numbers, which is quite difficult for users to remember.33 The 
domain name system employs alphanumeric names for ease of use.34 As a result, 
almost all of the words in the English language have already been registered as 
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domain names.35 Individuals or companies that wish to obtain a domain .n.ame 
often discover that the name is no longer available for registration. . . · 
T o ease the domain name scarcity problem, ICANN, 36 a nonprofit compa!)y 
that controls the domain name assigning system, has introduced more TLDs.for 
registration.37 The introduction of new TLDs, however, neither eliminates the 
domain name scarcity problem nor reduces the val ue ofdomain names that.ha~~ · 
been registered in the <.com> TLD. 38 Domain names in the <.com> TLD.;rre 
often viewed as most desirable39 b ecause "com" represents "commercial," .at:rd 
therefore Internet companies bel ieve that having a <.com > name mean~ ~h,ey 
are serious about e-comrnerce.40 · · 
Uncertain Tax Treatment of Domain Names 
Despite the great value of domain names to many onl ine businesses, I:Ule$ 
do not exist that specifically govern their proper tax treatment. Surely, the cpsts 
of purchasin g an existing domain name would not be immediately deductiPle; 
bu t rather would have to be capitalized.41 Under Treasury regulations issu.ed in 
2004, a taxpayer is requ ired to "capitalize amounts paid to another party -to a:c~ 
quire [an] intangible from that party in a purchase or similar transaction. »41 This 
rule "merely reflects [well-established] law requiring capitalization ofthe p.l,ii~ 
chase price ... paid to acq uire property from another."43 The regulatiorid lst 
some examples of intangible assets that must be capitalized if the iljtangijjl~ 
is acqu ired from another person in a purchase transaction. Although ·doin:!iti 
names are not listed, acquired domain names would certain ly fall within ·!he: 
capitalization rule. 
The real issue is whether the capitalized costs ofpurchasing a domain name 
may be eligible for deductions over time through an appropriate amoi:tizatro# 
allowance under an Internal Revenue Code ("Code") provision or ·sorn¢ ad~ 
m inistrative pronouncement. Unfortunately, none of the current amoi;ti:z<:(f~O)J. 
provisions in the Code specifica lly address domain names. 
TAX TREATMENT OF TRADEMARKS, TRADE NAMES, AND GOODWill 
Pre-1993 Tax law 
Prior to 1993, the tax law governing intangible assets favored certain tra~i~ 
tional intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights) over other tradition~~, 
intellectual property forms (trade secrets, trademarks, and trade names). T~~as.t!ty 
regulations provided that the costs of acquiring intangible assets having :a. ti~& 
ful life substantially beyond the taxabl.e year were not currently deduc~H:il~, ~B,).i~:. 
rath er cap italized.44 If, however, an acqu ired intangible asset could be sh"QWfl .tO:· 
have a limited useful life, then tl1e capitalized acqu isition costs were reco~erahl< 
(deductible) over tl1at asset's lifetime.45 As a corollary, the capitalize~ ¢.ostb~ 
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an intangible asset that had no definite useful life was not recoverable through 
amortization, but could only be recovered u pon abandonment or disposition of 
the asset 46 
Under this legal framewo rk, patents and copyrights were eligible for amorti­
zation due to the fact tha t they have limited useful lives (statu tory legal lives of 
twenty years in the case of patents and 70, 95, or 120 years in the case of certain 
copyrights).47 Trademarks and trade names were treated differen tly. There is no 
specific term of protection for trademarks and trade names; the protection is 
available as long as the trademark or trade name is used in com merce and has 
not been abandon ed .48 Accordingly, under pre-1993law, all trademark and trade 
name acq uisitions costs had to be capitalized and could only be recovered upon 
abandonment or disposition of those assets.49 
T he same was true for goodwill . Under pre-1993 tax law, the capitalized costs 
of acquiring goodwill were not eligible for amortization allowances, as goodwill 
does not have an ascertainable li mited life . 50 Lest there be any doubt, the Treas ury 
regulations have made clear since 1927 that "[n ]o deduc tion for depreciation is 
allowable with respect to goodwi11."51 The capitalized costs ofobtaining goodwill 
could only be recovered upon abandonment or disposition of the goodwill . 
Post-1993 Tax Law 
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 dramatically changed the tax treat­
ment of traditional forms of intellectual property and other intangible rights, 
including goodwill, by enacting section 197 of the Code. 52 Section 197 provides 
a fifteen-year amortization deduction for the capitalized costs of an "amortizable 
section 197 intangible," and proh ibits any other deprec iation or amortization 
deduction with respect to that property.53 Section 197 defines an "amortizable 
section 197 intangible" as any "section 197 intangible" acquired after August 
10, 1993, and h eld in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or 
an activity conducted for profit. 54 Section 197 provides a list of intangible assets 
that fall within the defin ition of"section 197 intangible" and that are sub ject to 
fifteen-year amortization. 
Section 197 also specifically exclu des certain intangible assets. Ifsection 197 
does no t apply to an intangible asset (that is, the asset is not listed as a section 197 
intangible or is specifically excluded from the definition), amortization continues 
to be governed by pre-section 197 law.55 Thus, an intangible asset that is not 
covered by section 197 and its fifteen-yea r amortization will be subject to an 
amortization allowance only if the asset h as a limited useful life, the duration of 
which can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy.S6 
Section 197 dra matically changed th e tax treatment of many forms of in­
tangible assets. Section 197 provided an arbitrary fifteen -year recovery period for 
many intangible assets th at were already amortizable over their useful lives w1der 
pre-section 197 law. More importantly, it provided for the first time an arbitrary 
fifteen-year recovery period for many in tangible assets that have u n limited usefu l 
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lives and, as a result, were not at all amortizable u nder pre-section 197 law. It 
also left the law as i t was for several other forms of intangible assets, permitting 
them to be recovered over their reasonable useful lives. What was clear after the 
enactment of section 197 was that the capitalized costs of creating or acquiring 
trad itional forms of intellectual property righ ts and many other intangibles were 
deductible over some recovery period (either fifteen years or the asset's useful 
life). 
Trademarks and Trade Names 
Subject to important exceptions noted below, a "section ] 97 intangible" 
generally includes any patent, copyright, formula, process, design, pattern, know­
how, format, package design, computer software, or interest in a film, sound 
recording, videotape, book, orother similar property.57 A "section 197 intangible" 
also includes any trademark or trade name.58 A trademark incl udes any word, 
n ame, symbol, device, or any combination thereof, adopted and used to identify 
goods or services and distinguish them from those provided by oth ers. 59 A trade 
name includes any name used to identify or designate a particular trade ,ot 
business or the name or titl e used by a person or orga nization engaged in a trade. 
or business.60 A trademark or trade name includes any trademark or trade nam.e · 
arising under statute or applicabl e common law and any similar right obtai nedby 
contract.61 The renewal of a trademark or trade name is treated as an acquisition 
of the b'ademark or trade name. 62 
Although the definition of"section 197 in tangible" appears broad enough to 
encompass nearly all forms of intellectual property, there are several important 
exceptions. Several exceptions in section 197 apply to intellectual property that 
is not acquired in a transaction (or series of related transactions) involving th e ac­
q uisition of assets constituting a b'ade or business or substantial portion th ereo[63 
For example, the term "section 197 intangible" does not include any interest 
(includ ing an interest as a licensee) in a patent, patent application, or copyright., 
that is not acquired as part of a purch ase of a trade or business.64 Trade secrets; 
know-how, b'ademarks, and trade names are not included within the exception fol: 
separately acquired assets. T h us, these forms of intellectual property are subject 
to fifteen-year amortization under section 197 regardless of whether they were 
acquired as pa rt ofa trade or business or separately. 
Goodwill 
In a dram atic sh ift in tax policy, section 197 was also structu red to govem 
th e tax ll'eatment of goodwi11.65 The term "section 197 intangible" is defined as 
includ ing goodwill, which is "the value of a trade or busin ess attributable to the 
expectancyofcontinued customer pall'onage."66 Accordingly, under current law~ 
a taxpayer can amortize the cost ofacqui ring goodwill ratably over a fifteen-year 
period irrespective of the fact that goodwill does not have a limited useful life. 
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TREATING DOMAIN NAMES AS TRADEMARKS OR GOODWILL? 
As has been illustrated, tax rules that govern traditional intellectual property 
and intangible rights exist. Tax rules do not exist, however, for new intangible 
rights that are emergi ng with th e arrival ofgloba l electronic com merce transac­
tions on the Internet, such as domain names. Although the legal nature ofdomain 
names is still unsettled, many tax advisors are looking to current tax principles 
governing famil iar intangible rights for guidance. For example, man y tax advi­
sors recommend treating domain names like trademarks. But is this appropriate 
considering domain names h ave u n ique characteristics? This section explores 
whether domain names can be classified with in a category of intellectual prop­
erty and intangible rights covered by existing tax principles (that is, trademarks 
and goodwill). 
Domain Names as Trademarks 
It h as been suggested that domain names should be subject to the same tax 
rules as trademarks. As discussed previously, amou nts paid or incurred to acquire 
a trademark must be capitalized and deducted ratably over fifteen years under 
section 197, regardless of whether the trademark is acquired separately or with a 
trade or business. For purposes of section 197, the term ·"trademark" "includes 
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, adopted and 
used to identify goods or services and distinguish them from those provided by 
others."67 Similarly, a trade name is defined as "any name used to identify or 
designate a particular trade or business or the name or title used by a person or 
organization engaged in a trade or b usin ess."68 Are these regulatory definitions 
broad enough to in.clude all domain names? D omain names serve a technical 
function of locating Web sites on the Internet. This tech nical function is not 
enough for domain ·names to fall within section 197's definition of "trademark" 
.or "trade name."69 Therefore, the relevant issue b ecomes whether domain names 
serve any other function so as to fall within the scope of section 197. 
It is well established that certain domain names may be registered as trade­
marks. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has issued guideli nes on 
tl1e registration ofdomain names as trademarks. 70 Unde r the PTO p olicy, d omain 
names are entitled to the protection afforded to trademarks if they are arbitrary, 
fanciful, suggestive, or descriptive, with acquired secondary meaning.71 Domain 
names that are merely descriptive or generic are not entitled to registration in the 
Principal Register.72 If a domain name con tains a descriptive or generic com­
ponent, its owner will be asked to disclaim that portion of the trademark. 73 For 
example, the owner of<nike....shoes.com> must disclaim an exclusive right to use 
th e word "shoes." If the descriptive or generic com ponent is part of a u nitary74 
do.main name such as <nike.shoes.com> or < nikesh oes.com>, no disclaimer is 
required.75 Regardless of whether a domain name is registered in the <.com>, 
<.org>, or <.net> TLD, the significa nt part of the domain name registration is 
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the second-level domain, the portion immediately to the left of the dot.7& More­
over, the ITO policy does not allow registration ofdomain names that "function 
as 'merely an informational indication ofthe domain name address used to access 
a website."'77 · 
Obviously, to beconsidered as a potential trademark for registration, a domain 
name must function as a source indicator.78 To qualify as a trademark, .th:e: 
registrant or owner of the domain name must use the domain name at its ·Web 
site to distinguish the goods or services offered there and to indicate the so.urce 
of those goods or services.79 More specifically, the Web site must be an ~Gfi'?.~ 
or interactive site that offers goods or services using the domain name to .idei).,tlfy. 
the source of the goods or services at the homepage or internal pages, capt:nrii:Ig 
the attention of Internet consumers. The domain name owner mU'st us.e the 
domain name in advertisements and sales in connection with the prodQ~ts ~.r·. 
services offered at the site.80 All these domain name uses are intended to co.ny~y 
to Internet consumers the relationship bel:\veen the domain name and the soiir~.e. 
of sponsorship of the goods or services offered at the Web site. Courts hay~ 
consistently held that domain names are not merely addresses, but powei:fiJl: 
source indicators on the Internet.81 · .. 
A domain n.ame can be a word, phrase, or combination ofwords and. n:Ji:ifl::' 
bers. Whether all domain names are protected under trademark law .reqti~ix:~~ · 
examination of trademark jurisprudence. Under trademark law, the inquiry 9(: 
whether a term is entitled to protection begins at the classification ofthe tei:m· 
within the spectrum ofdistinctiveness.82 Within the spectrum of distincti>?.~·n:e~.-· 
not all words and phrases receive protection under trademark law.83 ·Fu:rili:~~­
more, the law does not accord an equal level of protection to all words ~ltai.' 
qualify as trademarks._84 Determining whether a prot~c.ted trademark is stronfi~' 
the marketplace reqmres an assessment of the recogmtion value of the m-a_tk. ~, A 
conceptually stro1 trademark does not necessarily translate into a comme,r~i~J:ly 
strong trademark. 
Under trademark law, an .arbitrary or fanciful trademark is a~;;cor~e.d Jhe.. 
highest level of protection because it is deemed to be inherently distinctiVe:.&~ )t ' 
common word that is used in an uncommon, unexpected way to identify.a s:qt).(ce ·. 
of goods or services is an arbitrary trademark.88 It has no real connectjon ~ifli ': 
its associated goods or services. Examples of arbitrary trademarks include..~~~~· 
for computers and CAMEL for cigarettes.89 A fanciful trademark is an inveti.ted;,: 
coined, nondictionary word90 that is applied in "a unique, unfamiliar iJsage;· 
for the express purpose of serving as a trademark to be attached to a .Partic::;ular,:. 
product, but bearing no identifying trace to the product or source.1191 .SQ.me:·. 
fanciful trademarks include KODAK, CLOROX, POLAROID, and EXXON.92 
Descending the trademark distinctiveness spectrum, we see suggestive frij~e'-: 
marks, which are accorded less protection than arbitrary or fanciful tradero~iJ4:9~: 
Suggestive trademarks are words that require consumers to use their imagl.it~S·; 
tion to connect the trademark with its associated products or services.94 CrtilMN.~:: 
(which connotes an urban or modern bank), GOLIATH (which refers to the.l.atge = 
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size of its wooden pencils),95 and PASSION (which describes the fragrance of its 
cosmetics)96 are examples of suggestive trademarks. 
Words that describe the nature, quality, characteristics, or fu nction of 
products97 - such as KING SIZE for large men's clothes,98 NO SPOT for a carwash 
system,99 and WORLD BOOK for an encyclopedia 100 -are descriptive trademarks. 
This type oftrademark is not automatically entitled to trademark protection. In or­
der to receive protection for a descriptive trademark, an owner must demonstrate 
that consumers have come to perceive the trademark as a source identifier. 101 
Generally, six factors have been identified to help establish secondary meaning. 
They are (1) advertising expenditures; (2) consu mer studies linking the mark to 
a source; (3) unsolicited media coverage of the product; (4) sales success; (5) 
third party attempts to plagiarize the mark; and (6) the length and excl usivity of 
the mark's use. 102 The burden ofestablish ing secondary meaning is heavy, and 
p roof "entails vigorous evidentiary requ irements. "103 Essentially, the evidence 
must establ ish that the descriptive tradema rk identifies the producer, not the 
product.104 
On the bottom of the trademark protection spectrum are generic words, 
which never receive protection.105 Generic trademarks are common words that 
are names ofarticles in commerce.106 A. generic term generally refers to "the genus 
ofwhich a particular product is a species."107 Examples ofgeneric trademarks are 
APPLE for apples and COMPUTER for cdmputers.l08 Essentially, "a mark is generic 
if, in the mind of tl1e purehasing public it does not distinr,ish products on the 
basis of source but rather refers to the type of product.''10 Generic trademarks 
belong to the public. JIO No person has an exclusive right to use or monopolize a 
generic word that, in its ordinary or com mon meaning, names a good or service. 111 
Accordingly, domain names that are arbitrary with respect to the goods or 
services offered at their associated Web site receive a h igh level ofprotection u nder 
trademark law. <amazon.com> for an online bookstore liZ and <monster.com> 
for employment services are examples of arbitrary domain names.113 Similarly, 
<ebay.com> is a fanciful domain name for an online auction; it is an invented 
term that has no connection to the goods or services offered at its associated Web 
site. The domain name <goto.com> is a suggestive trademark for search engin~ 
services, 114 because it requires Internet surfers to use th eir imagination in making 
the connection between "go to" and Internet searches.lJS <goto.com > has been 
ranked as the twenty-sixth most visited Web site on the l nternet. 116 
Also on the distinctiveness spectrum ofdomain name trademark protection, 
we h ave descriptive domain names. < lawoffices.net> is an example of.a descrip­
tive trademark. 117 A descriptive domain name will not be accorded trademark 
protection unless ilie name has acquired secondary meaning. Given the vastness 
ofthe global network- the existence ofmore than forty-six million domain names, 
a bill ion readable Web pages, and numerous hosts-the owner of a descriptive 
domain name faces a tremendous task of proving secondary meaning_ us 
Moreover, du e to the n ature of the Internet, users can access a Web site 
by its descriptive name by typing the term as a keyword into a search engine. 
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This would pose difficulty for a domain name holder who attempts to prove 
that a descriptive domain name has acquired secondary meaning in the minds 
of Internet users.l19 In addition, courts have rejected evidence proving that tb.~ 
use of a Web site means equal identification with a particular provider, 120 e.Vi" 
dence of high placement of the associated Web site in search engine listings;!i i 
and evidence providing ranking information based on the number ofother sit~s 
that link to the associated Web site. 122 Courts often demand consumer survey 
evidence demonstrating that Internet consumers perceive the domain name :~s· 
a source identifier, not a description of the products or services at the w·~~· 
site. 123 Descriptive domain names th at have n ot acquired secondary me~q'" 
ing include < bigstar.com>, 124 < h ometown.net>, 125 <homemarket.com_>·; i?.6 
<lawoffices.net>,127 and <24h ourfitness.com >_IZ8 . 
The definition of "trademark" in section 197 is broad enough to inch~~~: 
domain names that are able to be protected as valid trademarks, such as th_qs~. 
considered arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive or descriptive with acquired second-ary · 
meaning. Therefore, purch ase costs allocable to domain names that func.tl(,)rl 
as trademarks should be amortized ratably over a fifteen-year period irrespec.th.e 
of the domain name's remaining registration period and registration renewal 
options. 
However, generic domain n_ames such as <fitness.com>, <wireless .. cq'Jit~k· 
<wine.com>, and <register.com> (which provides domain name registraJ!·pi~ 
services), are not entitled to protection. Forexample, a court held that <cds-.com> , 
(where the owner asserted that"cds" is in reference to compact d isc produ~is. ai:td 
services) is generic and therefore not enti tled to trade.mark p rotection.129 
Although generic domain names are not entitled to trademark protectiqn; 
they are greatly sought after by many Internet companies·. The tradeoff for select". 
ing a generic domain name without trademark protection is that the name rt¢~~s 
little promotion to be effective, as it d irectly communicates to Inte-rnet us~rs ·Jli.e: 
nature of the goods or services offered at the associated Web siteY0 The rati.on~le 
for not allowing generic domain names to have trademark protection is r.Qoled 
in the well-establish ed "genericn ess" doctrine. T he genericness doctrine d.ic.t,~tes. 
that generic terms cannot be appropriated or monopolized; all may use WQtcls· 
that comprise ord inary language. Indeed, no individual or entity may cornedhe. 
market on a term used in everyday speech to the exclusion of the public .~d: 
competitors who may seek, "at the risk ofpotential liability to one wh o laid diln:( 
to words ofcommon currency, to avail themselves of ordinary language to -re£et' 
to an article by its p ublicly accepted name."131 
Under the genericness doctrine, there is no trademark p rotection wh atsqe,yer; 
for generic terms, even if the terms have acquired secondary meaning. IJ.Z'rh i~: 
rule applies regardless ofhow longa term has been used in marketing a parti~u:tafr{ 
p roduct or service, or how closely the term h as come to be associated wi.tb. ·~(; 
particular source.133 Moreover, as the Supreme Court emphatically announ:c'ed\; 
sixty-six years ago, go.odwill in a generic term is shared by all, and its free exe~~ls< 
is in the interest of tl1e public.l34 
417 Taxing Trademarks and Domain Names 
The question then arises whether the costs of purchasing generic domain 
names are amortizable under section 197, iike the costs of purchasing domain 
names protected under trademark law. Some commentators have suggested that 
generic domain names might constitute a trademark or trade name for tax purposes 
even if they do not for intellectual property law purposes. In other words, generic 
doma in names may be included in the broad definition of a trademark or trade 
name under section 197, even though they cannot be trademarked because they 
are common names. To better understand this argument, a closer look at the tax 
definitions of trademark and trade name is in order. 
The regulations under section 197 define a trademark as "any word, name, . 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, adopted and used to identify goods 
or services and distinguish them from those provided by others.''135 Similarly, a 
trade name is defined as "any name used to identify or designate a particular 
trade or business or the name or title used by a person or organization engaged 
in a trade or business."l36 
More importantly, accordi ng to some commentators, the regulations state 
~at "[a] trademark or trade name includes any trademark or trade name aris­
ing under statute or applicable common law, and any similar right granted by 
contract."137 Relying on this regulatory definition, one commentator has sug­
gested that generic domain names, even tho ugh not able to be protected under 
trademark law, " can still serve to identify a certain company (or mascot) on the web 
and are registered rights," and th us are a" 'similar right' granted by contract." 138 
Another commentator has similarly suggested that a generic doma in name might 
be a similar righ t granted by con tract: 
(A] domain name is adopted to identify a web site and to distinguish that web site 
from web sites provided by others. Ifa web site itselfcould be deemed a 'service' 
then all domain names would constitute 'a similar right granted by contract' 
even though the domain name would not be a trademark under the Lanham 
Act. ... Although we might expect the definition of a trademark or trade name 
for tax purposes to follow that of applicable IP law, the regulations are clearly 
not so limited. The .fact that the regulations refer to 'a similar right granted by 
contract' means that the definition ofa trademark or trade name for tax purposes 
is broader than that under IP law. 139 
Contrary to the argume nts above, the definition of trademark under tax law 
is similar to the definition of trademark provided under the federal trademark 
statute, the Lanham Act. As noted above, regulations under section 197 define a 
trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, 
adop ted and used to identify goods or services and distinguish them from those 
provided by others."14{) Similarly, the Lanham Act provides that a trademark is a 
"word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person ... 
to identify and distingu ish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by 
others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 141 
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This strongly suggests that, like the Lanham Act, section 197 excludes geneti:q. 
domain n ames t hat do not function as trademarks because such names fail t O: 
identify and distinguish the associated goods or products from those provideq by 
others. 142 IdentifYing and distinguishing goods or services are the cornerston~ 
functions ofa trademark; a domain name that is unable to do so is therefore ·n·ot 
a trademark un der eith er section 197 or the Lanham Act 143 · 
Moreover, the regulations for section 197 indicating that " [a] trademark ·Qr. 
trade name includes any tradema rk or trade name arising u nder statute or appli~a.,. 
ble common law, and any similar right granted by contract," must be interpr~t~<{ 
consistently with the definition of trademark provided in the p lain languag<:!· .~f 
section 197. 144 That means that "any similar right granted by contract" cannot b,e . 
expanded to incl ude a name that is not capable of identifying and d istinguishing 
goods or services of one source from th ose of another. Furthermore, sta~tof.r· 
interpretation canons145 dictate that "any similar right granted by contract!' tnu~t 
be parallel to and cannot be in conflict with a right "arising under statu te or: 
applicable common law." 146 Oth erwise, the regulations defining trademarks <iii~ 
trade names could also in clude nontrademarks i n their scope, which would p·e 
an anomalous result. 147 
T he interpretation of section 197 and its regulations advocated by th·o~e W.b.c:?.• . 
believe generic domain names are capable of identifYing the Internet compa!1_Y •: 
behind associated Web sites is contrary to establish ed law stating that g-e!'l¢tt"c · 
words are incapable of identifying a producer, maker, or source. Generic wp-r:d~ . 
by the ir own nature identify products. T o say that generic dotnain names ;af,e · 
capable of identifying their owners would turn years of precedent on its hea:d,• 
Interpreting tax law at the detriment of well-established trademark law is .har.4iy . 
fu lfilling the intent of the drafters, carrying out tax policy, or serving t he p.ubl(c. •. 
good. · 
Domain Names as Nontrademarks 
As argued above, domain names th atfunction as source indicators -are tre~te4 · 
as trademarks for purposes of section 197. Generic domain names, however;-.ii'rf!· 
n ot. The question still remains whether the costs of purchasing generic d0ma.:irt 
names are amortizable under section 197. It could be argued that a generic 
domain name purchase should be treated as a goodwill pu rchase, ·amortiz·a'J?T~ 
over fifteen years un der section 197. Purch asing a gen eric domain name, as the 
argument m ight go, is the same as purch asing a company with a recognized fujmJe 
at a premium to its true asset value. . .. . 
Acqu ired goodwill is included within the defin ition of a section VP 
intangible asset. 148 The regulations defin e goodwill for p urposes of seGti:~if 
197 as "the value of a trade or business attribu table to the exp~<:;tan.~;y 9f 
continued customer patronage ... [that] may b e due to the name or- r~p):l.b~ 
tion of a trade or business or any other factor." 149 Does the value of a gerte:T,(c· 
domain name fit section I 97's definition of goodwill (that is, value attribut:aD:~e: 
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to expectancy of continued customer patronage)? P urch asing a generic domain 
name gives an owner the exclusive right to that name, for no two are identical. ISO 
Most importantly, a domain name allows an owner to direct Internet traffic to 
its Web site,151 provided the owner has developed a Web site associated with its 
domain name. 152 Internet users search for companies, products, and services by 
applying two common search methods. In ternet users can type a domain n ame 
directly into a web browser. 153 Or they can type a domain name into a search 
engine that conducts a search and provides users with choices ofWeb sites th ey 
may want to visit 154 The domain n ame serves as the link between the owner and 
users of a Web site.155 In addition, the domain name serves as an importan t signal 
used to locate resources on the Internet.156 
Bank ofAmerica, for example, purchased the domain name <loans.com> 
for three million dollars because the location received three to four thousand 
hits per day, even though the domain name was not associated with a developed 
Web site .157 Users looking for lending services on the Internet, without knowing 
ofany particular company, often decide to randomly select a name, most likely 
one that is easily associated with lending services, such as "loans"; they then type 
<www.loans.com> directly into the Web browser.158 Bank of America under­
stood how traffic reaches a Web site, the role of a memorable d omain name in 
e-commerce, so it pu rchased <loans.com> for a high p rice to obtain visitors at 
its soon-to-be-constructed Web site. 159 For the same reason, a n umber of oth er 
memorable domain names .command a h igh price on the secondary market. 160 
Clearly these memorable, generic domain names possess inherent value 
based on the number of visitors they attract, l6J even though n o Web site has 
been constructed, no business has been created, and no products or services have 
been offered. 162 The inherent value in gen eric domain names, h owever, is not 
id entical to the general concept of"goodwill"-; that is, a company's "expectation 
of continued patronage," which requires that the com£any continue in existence, 
offering goods or services and building a reputation. 1 3 
The concept of "goodwill"- is more akin to the value that a domain name 
accumulates after a company constru cts and maintains an associated Web site. 
Indeed, when a Web site is constructed and used in connection with the sale 
of products or services, value migh t be adde.d to th e domain name.164 Value is 
measured by the nu mber of visitors to the Web site and could be the res ult of a 
combination of factors, such as its online content, 165 ease of navigation, quality 
products or services, or exten sive and visible advertising. 166 
In sum, the inherent value of a generic domain name (value distinct from 
that added by the registrant or the person who has the righ t to use the domain 
name) is not the same a$ "goodwill" as defined in section 197.l67 However, value 
added by the registrant after a Web site is constructed and the domain name 
is used in connection with the site, could be considered "goodwill" within the 
meaning of section 197 (or ''trademark'' value as discussed above). Ia the latter 
case, the domain name is dependeot on the value or goodwill added. Indeed, th e 
domain name could not be .transferred without the value or goodwill added. 
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Ifgeneric domain names are not treated as "trademarks" or ''goodwill" und.e( 
section 197, the n ext issue is whether the costs of a generic domain name are, 
amortizable over any other Code provision or administrative pronouncement, 
As a general rule, if section 197 does not apply to acquired intellectual property 
rights, amortization continues to be governed by pre-section 197 law. Prior to 
the enactment of section 197, section 167 permitted a taxpayer to amortize 
the capitalized costs of acquiring certain in tangible property. To be eligible lq 
amortize the capitalized costs of acquiring intangible property under sectio.n 
167, the acquired asset must have an ascertainable useful life. In other words, 
intangible property not covered by section 197 may nevertheless be su bject to al) 
amortization allowance under section 167 if the intangible property is "known 
from experience or other factors to be of use in the trade or business or in. 
th e production of in come for only a lim ited period, the length of which may b.e 
estimated with reasonable accuracy." 168 Intangible property with no ascertainable 
useful life is not subject to th e allowance for amortization.169 
Does a gen eric domai n name have a determinable useful life so as to be 
eligible for amortization un der section 167? The regulations u nder sectitm 16/ 
provide that the useful life ofan asset is not necessarily the statutory legal life ofthe 
asset, but rather is the "period over which the asset may reasonably be expected. 
to b e useful to the taxpayer in his or her trade or business or in the p roductiol) of· 
income." 170 It might be argued that the useful life ofa domain n ame is the init!~J. 
.registration perio·d. After all, there is an initial domain name registration perjqd 
for a generic domain name (for example, 1, 2, 5, or 10 years) depending on the 
agreement with the domain name registrar, and a doma in name might be lost· if 
the registrant does not renew it. 
Despite the suggestion t~at a,~eneric d~ma.i n name "can s~JI be co~sidered: 
an asset that can be amortiZed, 71 amortizatiOn of a genenc domam n ante 
un der section 167 is improper and inconsistent with the general, pre-section ~91 
treatment of intangibles. To permit generic domain name acquisition costs to· b:~ 
written off over the domain name's in itial registration period makes little sens~, 
The initial period is often short and would allow purchasers to recover substantj<!l 
acqu isition costs over a very short fecovery period. More importantly, purcha:S.'e.t.£ 
often plan to use domain names for periods extending well b eyond the ini~ial 
registration period. T he cost to renew a generic domain name is minimal, al'ld 
for most purchasers, contin ued registration is expected. . 
To permit generic domain name purch asers to pick an amortization per.iQc;l 
over which they expect the generic domain names to be useful in their busin~: 
is troublesome. Generic domain names are un like other amortizable intangil:?l~ 
assets with inherent value, such as separately acquired patents and copyrightsi­
wh ich are readily susceptible to such esti.mates. For example, a taxpayer ~.a.i;l; 
typically establish the useful life ofa patentor copyright for amortization purpo~~ 
based on his own experien ces with similar property. 172 If such experiences .ar~ 
inadequate, a taxpayer can establish the useful life of a patent or copyright based 
on general industry standards. 173 
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The same is n ot true for generic domain names. The useful life of a paten t or 
copyright (and hence the recovery period over which deductions will be allowed) 
is typica1ly tied to the period over which the patent or copyright will most likely 
generate income for the taxpayer.174 Indeed, the goal behind pe rmitting taxpayers 
depreciation or amortization deductions is to achieve a fair allocation of th e costs 
ofacquiring an asset to the period in which the taxpayer realizes income from the 
asset.175 The economic usefulness ofa generic domain name cannot be measured 
by th e domain name's condition or by the passage oftime, suggesting that gen eric 
domain names should not be subject to amortization u nder section 167. 
In short, the useful life of a generic domain name is unascertainable. The 
owner of a generic domain name today cannot be the owner tomorrow if he 
or she forgets to renew the domain name registration. Yet, the owner of a 
generic domain name can bring a conversion action against th e registrar who 
assigns the domain name to others without the original owner's permission, given 
that the domain name registration at the time of the assignmen t or transfer was 
valid. Although a generic domain name ca n be acquired separately for its inh erent 
value, the name itself does not have an ascertainable useful life. Indeed, a generic 
d omai n name can last forever, as long as the owner pays the registration fees. 
It should be noted th at in January 2004, th e Internal Revenue Service (Ser­
vice) issued final regula tions un der section 167 that p rovide a fiftee n-year safe 
harbor amortization period for certain self-created intangible assets that do not 
h ave readily ascerta inable usefullives.176 U nder th e safe harbor, amortization is 
determined using a straight-line method with no salvage value, consistent with 
amortization u nder section 197.177 Does this safe harbor amortization apply to 
purchased generic domain names when amortization is not authorized u nder 
sections 197 or 167 of the Code? Unfortunately, the answer is no. The regula­
tion s provide t hat the safe harbor amortization governs only certain self-created 
intangible assets and does not apply to intangibles acquired from another purty. 
CONCLUSION 
It has b een conclu ded that, under current tax rules, the costs of purchasin g a 
domain name that fu nctions as a trademark are amortizable over fifteen years u n­
der section 197, whereas the costs of purch asing a gen eric domain name are not 
amortizable at all unless it can be shown that a portion of the cost is attributable 
to "goodwill" or "trademark" value. This conclusion is troubling in light of 
the fact tha t m ost intangible prope rty with sign ificant value is amortizable over 
some period, either the arbitrary fifteen-year recovery period under section 197 
or the intangible property's useful life under section 167. If val uable intangible 
business assets such as trademarks, trade n ames, and goodwill are amortizabl(!, 
why are acquired generic doma in names not amortizable? It seems that the ap­
proach of trying to classify domain names as one or more variations of existing 
intellectu al or intangible property rights, and then looking for the appropriate 
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current tax rules dealing with those variations, has produced an unsatisfactory tax 
regime for domain names. 
For example, there is a distinction under current tax law between domain 
names that function as trademarks and those that do not. What happens if a 
portion of the value of a generic domain name derives from its association witb 
a particular business? Should the generic domain name now be considered 
two assets, one with inherent value (not amortizable) and the other with either 
goodwill or trademark value (amortizable)? Consider the following example: 
<car.com > is a domain name where "car" is a generic word such as vitamins, 
wireless, and loans. The name is owned and used by a Web site that at first wa$ 
not an active business. Subsequently, the Web site receives repeated unique hits 
an d develops a large and loyal customer base. The Web site owner th en decide~ 
to sell the business, including the domain name, wh ich now has a market value 
of $5.5 million. 178 According to one commentator: 
A portion ofthe value ofthe name derives from its association with the business. 
So to some extent, the name should be treated as having trademark value. The 
remaining value is the name's inherent value. T11e inherent and trademark 
values in this transaction are separate assets, and their values have different 
sources. One derives from the inherent value of the exclusive use of a generic 
term, and the other derives from the goodwill of the business.179 
It would follow then, under existing tax rules, that a portion ofthe costofa generi.<\ 
domain name would be eligible for amortization, and the other portion of thE! 
cost would not be eligible for amortization. 
This approach would result in much litigation concerning the identificatiqi;l 
ofand valuation ofdomain names. Because no amortization would be allowed fot 
the inherentvalue ofa domain name, taxpayers would try to distinguish trademad~ 
value from inherent value in a single domain name, and the Service wouid 
undoubtedly challenge their determinations. Taxpayers who have the resou~:c~s. 
to litigate over the identification and valuation ofdomain names would be better 
off than those taxpayers who lack such resources. Needless to say, fitting doma.\!): 
names within existing tax rules would produce much litigation and uncertainty; 
The inadequacies and un certainties of the current tax regime are becoming 
more apparent with the emergence of new forms of intellectual property righ~s, 
As with domain names, no special tax rules exist specifically governing the ~x 
treatment ofWeb site creation and acquisition costs. Taxpayers and advisors (ire . 
left with questions such as: Should the costs related to the development of a W¢b 
site be treated the same as software development costs? How should the cqsts .of' 
creatingor purchasing content for Web sites be treated? Does it make a differeM$ 
if some Web site content is copyrightable or noncopyrightable? 
IfWeb sites are considered variations of existing intellectual or intangi~~¢: 
p roperty rights to which existing tax law can be adopted, then the tax treatrnerif : 
ofWeb sites may depend on the Web site's components (for example, software, · 
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copyrightable content, noncopyrightable content). This result could produce 
varying rules not easily applied in practice. For example, if the Service agrees 
that the basic structure of a Web site (the permanent portion of the site) should 
be t reated as "software," a Web developer would be able to immediately deduct 
the costs of building the basic structure of the site under Revenue P rocedure 
2000-50. 180 If a taxpayer incurred costs to develop copyrightable content such 
as literary text, music, photographic images, art works, graphics, and sound, 
such costs would either be currently deductible or amortized over the useful 
life of the copyright.181 Ifa taxpayer incurred costs to develop noncopyrightable 
content, such costs m ight not have to be capitalized. 182 If the costs ofdeveloping 
noncopyr.ightable content must be capitalized, they would only be amortizable 
ifa useful life could be established.183 
Again, current and h istorical tax concepts (section 197 and prNection 197 
law) do not transla te smooth ly with respect to the expansion ofexisting rights for 
certain intangible assets or, more importan tly, the emergence of new intellectual 
property and intangible rights such _as domain n ames . An unfortunate trend that 
is developing is an ad hoc response by administrative bodies to fill in the gaps. 
For example, the Service issued an administrative pronouncement, Reven ue 
Procedure 2000-50, to clarify the uncerta in tax treatment ofsoftware development 
costs. More recently, the Service adopted new regulations under s_ection 167, 
T reasury Regulation s_ection l.l67(a)-3(b), to provide a fifteen-year safe harbor 
amortization period for created intangibles that do not have an ascertainable 
useful life. 
Each time the Service responds to inadequacies in the current tax law, new 
issues are raised and additional u ncertainties are created. A better approach would 
be for Congress to revisit section 197' s treatmentof intangible assets. Section 197 
has received little legislative attention since its enactment over ten years ago. 
W ith the arrival ofglobal electronic commerce transact ions on the Internet, the 
nature of cyberspace will undoubtedly require new tax rules. 
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21. Id. Amongthe car-related domain names, <cars.com> was a subject oflitigation, 
and a federa l court foun d that the se rvice mark CARS.COM was a "famous mark(]." Classified 
Ventures, LLC v. Softcell Mktg., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 898, 900-901 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(finding that plaintiff had developed ·cARS.COM into a strong and famous mark within 
one year and noting that "(g]iven the nature of communication, particularly over the 
Internet, even marks advertised but a year can develop strength and fame" and that the 
site's overnight success is "evide nt by the activity on the Cars.com Site, ·which is one of 
the most heavily trafficked a uto-related web sites on the Internet"). 
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22. Domain Name Prices Rise Again, Investor's Bus. Daily, Dec. 29, 2003, at A2 
(reporting that domain name prices are on the rise again as evident by the purchase of 
<men. com> for $1.3 million by a group of entertainment executives from Rick Schwartz). 
23. Cool.com: Most Valuable Domain Name?, MSNBC, http://www.zdnet.com/ 
2100-9595_22-519606.html (Mar. 30, 2000) (reporting various offers for purchasing dO­
main names <cool.com> and <america.com> ). 
24. Essential Monitoring, Internet Mag., Nov. I, 2003, at 26 (stating that users visit 
Web sites by typing domain names directly as a URL address and thus having a memorable 
domain name is important); David P. Miranda, The Master o{Y our Domain Name, In tell. 
Prop. L. Newsletter, Winter 2000, at 23 (stati11g that as "websites on the Internet continue 
to proliferate, the value of memorable domain names have skyrocketed"). 
25. Daniel Joelson, Banks Square Off Over Internet Domain Names, Bank Tech. 
News, Nov. 22, 2000, at I {reporting the number of visitors to < loans.com> without 
having an active Web site). 
26. Id. {reporting banks attempting to establish tl1eir presence on the Internet). 
27. Gayle Weiswasser, Domain Names, The Internet, and Trademarks: Infringement 
in Cyberspace, 20 Santa Cla ra Computer & High Tech. L.J. 215,224 (2003) (statingiliatin 
order for Internet companies to communicate effectively to their customers, it is essential 
that they have a unique domain name iliat is easily recognizable to customers). Domain 
names are seen as the "corporate identity in the information age" and "the electron ic signs 
on the virtual storefronts." Id.; see also Steve Higgins, What's in an Internet Name? To 
On-Line Marketers, Lots, Investor's Bus. Daily, Oct. 17, 1995, at AIO ("Catchy addresse$ 
are as important to on-line merchants as prime retail space is to conven tional merchants, 
cybernaLits say. It's easier to order jewelry from a business that can be reached by typing 
'gold.com,' for example, than it is to buy itfrom another vendor with a forgettable address.'"); 
David P. Krivoshik, Intellectual Property: Paying Ransom on the Internet, N.J. L.J., Oct. 
23, 1995, at 10 (discussing valuable domain names in e-commerce). 
28. See Peter B. Maggs, The '.US' Internet Domain, 50 Am. J. Computer L. 297, 29.8' 
(2002) (noting that because "domain names are used by people to identify businesses and 
institutions, it is impo rtant that iliey be easy to remember, easy to use, and have positiv~ 
connotations"); Minqin Wang, Regulating the Domain Name System: Is the ".Biz" Domain 
Name Distribution Scheme an Illegal Lottery?, 2003 U. lll. L. Rev. 245, 271 ("[W]ith ~e 
emergence of the Internet as a market place for products and services, ilie ownership of ·a 
domain name can be very valuable, especially if it is an easy to guess or easy to -remember 
name representing a company, industry, product, or service."); Shelley Rowland & Ti$ 
Jackson, Protecting Your IP, l ndep. Bus. Wkly., June 19, 2002 {recommending companies 
to "consider domain na me registrations as a part of an overall brandi ng strategy"). 
29. See Jon Swartz, Sex.com Ownership Ruling Expected, USA Today, Aug. 2, 20001 
at 3B. The <sex. com> site had reportedly received twenty-five million visitors daily. Elen 
Lewis, Sex Education, New Media Age, June 28, 2001; see also Joseph Menn, Tangled 
Tale ofthe Pilfered Porn Site Courts: Stephen Cohen, One ofthe Internet's Most Succe5s{Ql 
Entrepreneurs, Made His Fortune by Stealing the Sex.com Site, L.A. Times, Mar. 26,2001:, 
at C l (reporting on the litigation over ownership of ilie <sex. com> domain name). . 
30. The scarcity of domai n na mes is attributable to four key factors: ilie technical 
uniqueness, ilie semantic uniqueness, the economic uniqueness, and the origin unique;.: 
ness of domain names. Christopher Reed, Internet Law: Text and Materials 38 (2000.); 
Some commentators, however, believe iliat ilie scarcity is artificially created by the lackof 
democratic participation in the control of Top-Level-Domains. See Jay P. Kesan, Private. 
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Internet Governance, 35 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 87, 116 (2003) (summarizing critiques of the 
domain name assigning systems). 
31. Christopher S. Lee, The Development ofArbitration in the &solution ofInternet 
Domain Name Disputes, 7 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 2, '11,. 7-10 (2000), http://law.richmond. 
edu/jolt/v7illarticle2.pdf (stating that NSI is the registrar that provided domain name 
registration services for domain names in the TLDs <.com>, <.org>, and <.net>). 
32. See A. Michael Froomkin &Mark A. Lemley, ICANN 6 Antitrust, 2003 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. I, 6 (2003) (noting that because Internet Protocol "numbers are hard for people 
to remember, Internet standards provide for the creation ofmnemonic names [or domain 
names) for resources"); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape ofGovernance: Analyzing 
the World ofInternet Regulation, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 605,657 (2003) (stating that the Internet 
domain nam e system makes "it easier for humans to memorize where in cyberspace a 
particular piece of information is located or how a particular communication partner 
can be reached" and that "(i]n essence, a domain name is mnemonic shorthand for the 
hard-to-remember numerical Internet address"). 
33. Tamarah Belczyk, Domain Names: The Special Case of Personal Names, 82 
B.U. L. Rev. 485, 489 (2002) (noting that host computers connected to the Internet are 
identified and located by numerical Internet Protocol addresses that "consist ofa series of 
numbers separated by periods, for example 123.456.789.12"). 
34. Steven Blackerby, Flat Broke and Busted, But Can I Keep My Domain Name? 
Domain Name Property Interests in the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, 11 J. Intell. 
Prop. L. 117, 121 (2003) (noting that "[b]ecause people remember names better than [a 
long string ofJ numbers," the Domain Name System was designed to translate domain 
names used by humans into the numeric Internet Protocol addresses used by computers 
connected to the Internet). 
35. Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 7 15, 793 n.437 
(2003); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name 
System, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 149, 158 (2000) (noti ng that essentially every word 
in the E nglish dictionary has been registered as a domain name). 
36. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is an interna­
tionally organized, nonprofit corporation that is 
responsible for managing and coordinating the Domain Name System ("DNS") 
to ensure that every address is unique and that all users of the Internet can 
find all valid addresses. It does this by overseeing the distribution of unique IP 
addresses and domain names. It also ensures that each domain name maps to 
the correct IP address. 
ICANN, FAQs, at http://www.icann.org/faq/#WhatisiCANN (last modified June 9, 2004). 
37. David E. Roberts, Top Level.Domain Reorganization: A Constitutional Solution 
to Legislative AJ.tempts at Internet Regulation, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 883, 904 (2003) (stating that 
ICANN responded to the saturation of the < .com > TLD by creating seven new T LDs); 
Segal, supra note 16, at 1, ,,18-20. 
38. Orion Armon, Is This as Good as It Gets? An Appraisal ofiCANN's Uniform Do­
main Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UD RP) Three Years After Implementation, 22 Rev. 
Litig. 99, 10}-104 (2003) (noting that th e introduction of the new TLDs such as <.info> 
and <.biz>, among others, will not "markedly reduce the number of Internet domain 
name ... disputes, because the availability of new TLDs has not prompted companies to 
abandon their old <.com> domains" and many new domain name registrations in the 
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new TLDs "are being used as 'pointers' to forward Internet browsers to websites in the 
<.com> TLD"). 
39. Connie L. Ellerbach, Domain Name Dispute Remedies: Tools for Taming the 
World Wide Web, 759 PLI/Pat 513, 516 (2003) (noting that the <.com> TLD "has become 
the [TLD) of choice, desired by both commercial and non-commercial entities"). 
40. Litman, supra note 35, at 158-l 59 (stating that "[b]ecause of successful advertis­
ing, a large segment of the public had come to view.com as the only 'real' domain"). 
41. Most taxpayers prefer to fully recover costs through immediate deductions rather 
than spread those costs over a number of years (i.e., amortize the costs) or recover those 
costs when the property is disposed of (i.e., subtract the costs from the amount realized 
on a sale to determine gain realized). Unfortunately, there are a number of overriding 
Code provisions that prevent the current deductibility of otherwise allowable expenditures. 
Thus, what may seem to be a deductible expense under one provision may be classified 
as a non-deductible expend iture under another overriding provision. A major overriding 
provision isone that disallows the immediate deduction of costs that are considered "capital 
expenditures." See l.R.C. § 263(a) (providing for nondeductibility of capital expenditures); 
see also id. § 263A(a) (requ iring a taxpayer to capitalize all direct and indirect expenditures 
incurred to produce certain property). 
42. Treas. Reg. 1.263(a)-4(c)(l ). The reason such acquisition costs are not currently 
deductible is that the resulting property is not consumed or used within the year, but rathe r 
persists and generates income over a period of years. If the costs incurred to acquire such 
property were deductible in full in the current year, then there would be a mismatching 
of income and expenses that produced that income. Income would be understated in the 
year of acquisition and overstated in later years. This problem is avoided by prohibiting 
the immediate deduction of capitalized acqu isition costs. 
43. 67 Fed. Reg. 77701, 77703, pmbl. (Dec. 19, 2002). 
44. Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-2(a). The reason such intangible asset acquisition costs 
are not currently deductible is that the resulting acquired intangibles are not cons umed or 
used within the year, but rather persist and gene rate income over a period of years. If the 
costs incurred to acquire such intangible assets were deductible in full in the current year, 
then there would be a mismatching of income and expenses that produced that income. 
Income would be understated in the year of acqu isition and overstated in later years. This 
problem is avoided by prohibiting the immediate deduction of capitalized acquisition 
costs. 
45. Jd. § 1.167(a}-3 ("Ifan intangible asset is known from experience or other factors 
to be of usc in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the 
length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may 
be the subject of a depreciation allowance."). 
46. Id. ("An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to 
the allowance for depreciation."). 
47. Indeed, the regulations specifically mentioned patents and copyrights as intan­
gible assets eligible for amortization. /d. 
48. Unde r federal trademark law, abandonment is presumed if nonuse of the trade­
mark extends for three years. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Token uses of a trademark for the 
purpose of reserving trademark rights do not prevent a findi ng of abandonment. Exxon 
Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 99- 103 (5th Cir. 1983). In addition, 
abandonment of a trademark could occur if the owner failed to police tl1e trademark so· 
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that it becomes the generic name for the product or service with which it is used. 15 
u.s.c. § 1127. 
49. I.R.C. § 177 (repealed 1986) permitted taxpayers to elect to amortize any trade­
mark or trade name expenditures over a period of five years or more. 
50. The prohibition against amortizing the cost of goodwill first appeared in Treas. 
Reg. § l.l67(a)- 3, which stated that "[n]o deduction for depreciation is allowable with 
respect to good will." This prohibition first appeared in the regulations in 1927. See Kevin 
R. Conzelmann, 533-2d T. M., Amortization ofintangibles, A-5 & n.3l (2001) (citing 
T.D. 4055, VI- 2 C.B. 63; Reg. 69, Art. 163 (Revenue Act of 1926)). 
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960); see Conzelmann, supra note 50, at A-5 & n.31 
(citations omitted). 
52. Revenue Reconciliation Act ofl993, P.L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 ( 1993) (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 197). 
53. I.R.C. §197(a)-(b).The amortization deduction undersection 197 is determined 
by amortizing the capitalized costs ratably over a fifteen-year period beginning on the first 
day of the month in which the property is acquired and held in connection with a trade 
or business or- activity conducted for profit. Id. § l97(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.197- Z(f)( l) 
(as amended in 2000); see l.R.C . § 162 (trade or business expenses); id. § 2 12 (activity 
cond ucted for profit). 
54. I.R.C. § 197(c)(1). 
55. Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-l4(a) (providing that intangibles excluded from section 
197 are amortizable only if they qual ifyas property subject to the allowance for depreciation 
under section 167(a)). 
56. Id. § l.l67(a)-3 (pre-section l97law and current law for intangibles otherwise 
excluded from section 197). 
57. Id. § l.l97-2(b)(5). 





63. I.R.C. § 197(e). A trade or business that is acquired in a series of related trans­
actions will be considered acquired in one transaction for applying section 197. Id. § 
197(e)(4). 
64. Id. § l97(e)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(c)(7)("A patent or copyright includes any 
incidental or ancillary rights (su ch as a trademark or trade name) that are necessary to 
effect the acquisition of title to, the ownership of, or the right to use the property and are 
used only in connection with that property."). 
65. I.R.C. § 197(d)(l)(A)- (B). 
66. Treas. Reg. § l.l97- 2(b)(l). 
67. Id. § l.l97- 2(b)(l0)(i) (2000). 
68. Id. 
69. The technical function of locating sites on the Internet does not fall within the 
required defin itional function of identifying goods or services and distinguishing them 
from those provided by others. 
70. See 555-1212.com,Inc. v. Commc'n Houseint'l, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1086 
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (mentioning ITO registered domain name); Image Online Design, Inc. 
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v. Core Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 870, 878 (C.D. CaL 2000) (stating PTO governs trademark 
registrations for domain names); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Examination Guide 
No. 2-99: Marks Composed, in Whole or in Part, of Domain Names (1999) [hereinafter 
PTO Examination Guide o. 2-99] (explaining PTO policy of registering domain 
names as trademarks), available at http://www. uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide299. 
htm. 
7L See PTO Examination Guide No. 2- 99, supra note 70. 
72. Seeid. 
73. When an owner disclaims a portion of a trademark, the owner canno t assert that 
it has any rights to th at portion of the trademark 15 U.S.C. § 1056 (2003). 
74. A mark is unitary if it creates "a commercial impression separate and apart 
from any unregistrable component" See Trademark Manual of Examini ng Procedure § 
1213.05, at 1200-1214 (3d ed. 2003). 
75. PTO Examination Guide No. 2-99, supra note 70. 
76. See Christie L. Branson, Comment, Was $7.5 Million a Good Deal for Busi­
ness.com? The Difficulties ofObtaining Trademark Protection and Registration for Generic 
and Descriptive Domain Names, 17 Santa Clalll Computer & High Tech L.J. 285, 305 
(2001) (discussing the PTO policy on registering domain names as trademarks). 
77. Eric G. Begun, Even Courts Aren't Sure: Domain Name: Property? Contract?, 
N.J. Law., Sept. 10, 200 1, at 7. 
78. 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfai r Co mpetition § 7:17.1, at 7- 25 (4 th ed. 
1996) ("A domain name can become a trademark if it is used as a trademark."). 
79. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 
956 (C. D. Cal. 1997) (noting that when a domain name is used only to indicate an ad dress 
on the Internet and not to identify th e source of specifi c goods and services, the name is not 
functioning as a trade mark); 2Jerome Gilson &Jeffrey M. Samuels, Trademark Protection 
and Practice §§ 5.11 (1997) (distinguishing the techni cal use from the trademark use of 
domain names to identify goods and services). 
80. C(. Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 628 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (Merritt, J., concurring) (noting that Data Concepts failed to establish use of 
the < dci.com > domain name as a tradema rk, "(~or instance, there is no evidence in 
the record indicating whether Data Conce pts disseminated advertisements of its services 
displaying the' dci.com' address or whether the company's customers or employees simply 
passed the 'dci.com' address along to potentia l customers in the same way someone might 
give out a telepho ne nu mber"). 
81. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F. 3d 1036, 
1055 (9th Cir. 1999) (recogruzing that "(t]he domain name is more than a mere address: 
like trademarks, second-level domain names commu nicate information as to source"); 
Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Tnc., 1997 WL 811770, at •4 n.6 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 18, 1997) ("Because of the importance of a domain name in identifying the 
source of a website, many courts have held that the use of a trademark within the domain 
name of a URL can constitute a trademark violation."); Cardservice ln t'l v. McGee, 9SO·F. 
Supp. 737, 741 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 1997 WL 716186 (4th Cir. 1997); Panavision Infl 
v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, l 304 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
82. uA court's inquiry into whether a term merits trademark protection starts with the 
classification of that term along the spectrum of 'distinctiveness."' Boston Beer Co. L.P. v. 
Slesa.r Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 180 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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83. DeGidio v. W. Group Corp., 355 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that 
whether a trademark qualifies for "protection is determined by where the mark falls along 
the established spectrum ofdistinctiveness"). 
84. See id. (discussing the disti nctiveness spectrum of trademarks and finding that 
arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive trademarks are inherently distinctive and automatically 
entitled to protection, descriptive trademarks are accorded protection only if they ac­
q uired a secondary meaning, and generic marks are never distinctive and do not receive 
protection); GoT o.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Trademarks "can be conceptually classified along a spectrum of increasing inherent 
distinctiveness. From weakest to strongest, marks are categorized as generic, descriptive, 
suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful." (citations omitted)). 
85. See King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 
1093 (lOth Cir. 1999) (stating th at "to assess the relative strength of a mark, one 
must consider the two aspects of strength: (l) 'Conceptual Strength: the placement 
of the mark on the (dis tinctiveness or fanciful-suggestive-descriptive] spectrum '; and 
(2) 'Commercial Strength: the marketplace recognition value of the mark' " (citation 
omitted)). 
86. See Sunenblick v. Harrell, 895 F. Supp. 616, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[A] mark 
may be conceptually strong and yet commercially weak if the mark lacks the requisite 
'origin-indicating' quality in the eyes of consumers.''). 
87. See Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 
1996) (stating ·that "an arbitrary or fanc iful trademark is the strongest type of mark and is 
afforded the highest level of protection" (citing Cellular Sales, Inc. v. MacKay, 942 F.2d 
483,485 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also Eli Lilly 6 Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 
462 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming the finding that PROZAc® is a "fanciful word that has no 
meaning independent of Lilly's mark" and that "[s]uch marks are entitled to the highest 
protection"). 
88. See generally Sports Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 335 F.3d 453, 
460 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003); Union Nat' I Bank ofTex., Laredo, Texas v. Union Nat'l Bank of 
Tex., Austin, Texas, 909 F .2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1990). 
89. SeeBigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 198(S. D.N.Y. 
2000) (noting that "'APPLE' as a brand name for a computer or 'xERox'" for a copier are 
arbitrary and fanciful trademarks, respectively). 
90. See Tri:msamerica Corp. v. Trans Am. Abstract Serv., Inc., 698 F. Supp. 1067, 
1071 (E.O.N.Y. 1988) (stating that a fanciful trademark is " 'a word invented solely for 
use as a trademark'" (quoting Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American Sch. of 
Travel, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1026, 1033 (S.D.NY. 1986), affd without opinion, 810 F.2d. 
1160 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
91. BigStar Entm't, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 197; see also Sport Supply Group, 335 F.3d. 
at461 n.7. 
92. Larsen v. Terk Techs. Corp., 151 F.3d 140, 148 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998). 
93. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that 
arbitrary or fanciful trademarks "receive broader protection than weak marks, those that 
are descriptive or suggestive ofthe products on which they are used''). ­
94. "A term is suggestive if it requires imagina'tion, thought and perception to reach 
a conclusion as to the nature of the goods." Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs 6 Mfrs., 
Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479,488 (S.D .N.Y. 1968). 
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95. Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Gold Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 
1117 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that CIT!BANK and COUATH are suggestive trademarks) . 
96. See Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co., Inc. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. 
Supp. 1238, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding PASSION a suggestive trademark). 
97. See Stix Prods. , 295 F. Supp. at488 ("Aterm is descriptive if it forthwith conveys 
an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods."). 
98. See King-Size, Inc. v. Frank's King Size Clothes, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1138, 1156 
(S.D. Tex. 1982) (finding KING-SIZE a descriptive trademark for large men's clothes). 
99. See Raco Car Wash Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 730 F Supp. 695, 701 (D.S.C. 1989) 
(finding "No Spot'' a descriptive trademark), appeal dismissed, 929 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 
1991)). 
100. See Field Enters. Educ. Corp. v. Cove Indus., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 989, 992 
(E.D.N.Y. 1969). 
I0 l. Secondary meaning attaches if "the consuming public primarily associates the 
term with a pa rticular source." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 97 3 F .2d 
10 33, 1040 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Centaur Commc'ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc'ns, Inc., 830 
F.2d 1217,1221 (2dCir. 1987)). 
102. See Centaur Commc'ns, 830 F.2d at 1221 (listing the factors for determining 
whether a descriptive mark has achieved secondary meaning). 
103. 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas]. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972)). 
104. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 , 786 (1992) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) ("['Ilhe user of a ... descriptive word or symbol could obtain relief only 
if he first showed that h is trade name did in fact represent not just the product, but a 
producer. ... "). 
105. See S{JQrt Supply Group, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 335 FJd 453, 460 n.7 (5th 
C ir. 2003) (noting that a generic trademark, "which refers to an entire class of products 
(such as 'airplane' or 'computer'), does not distinguish a product at all, and therefore 
receives no protection under trademark law"); A6H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret 
Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 222 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that generic marks receive no 
protection and "they are npt 'trademarks' at all"). 
106. "A generic term is one that is com monly used as the name of a kind of goods. 
Unlike a trademark, which identifies the source of a product, a generic term merely 
specifies the genus of which the particular product is a species." Liquid Controls Corp. v. 
Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.Zd 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
107. 815 Tonawanda St. Corp. v. Fay's Drug Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 643, 647 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
108. See Sport Supply Group, 335 F.3d at 460 n.7. 
109. Courtenay Commc'ns Corp. v. Hall, 334 FJd 210, 214 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003). 
110. See Interstellar StarshipServs., Ltd. v. Epix,Inc., 304 F.3d 936,944 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that an apple grower in Washington may use the domain name <www.apple.com> 
to promote his business and has no fear of infringi ng the famous APPLE trademark for 
computers). 
lll. See Am. Cyanamid Corp, v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Ci~. 
1986) ("A trademark holder cannot appropriate generic ... terms for its exclusive use, 
and a trademark infringement finding thus cannot be based on the use of a gen eric .. . 
term... . "). 
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112. See Interstellar Starship Servs., 304 F.3d at 943 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
"Amazon" is an arbitrary trademark). 
11 3. See Mark J. G undersen, Want to Be Ruler o{Your Own Domain? The Name's 
the Thing in E-Business, 11 Bus. L. Today 19, 19 (2002) (stating that <monsters.com> 
is an arbinary domain name and may requ ire more advertising to create an association 
between the name and the service or product supplied at the associated Web site). 
114. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F .3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that GOTO is a suggestive trademark for search engine services) . 
11 5. Id. 
116 . See id. at 1208 (noting that the domain name and its assoc iated Web site was 
ranked as th e twenty-sixth most visited Web site; ana lyzing the trademark, words and logos, 
and bow the trademark is used in the lntemet by the trademark owner and others; and 
concluding that the trademark is not strong). 
117 . DeGidio v. W. Group Gorp., 355 F.3d at 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirm­
ing the district court's finding that < lawoffices.net> is a descriptive trademark of an 
"online database of attorneys and the electron ic publication via a global network of 
computers") . 
118. Id. at 513 (listing a seven-factor test for assessment ofsecondary meaning); BigStar 
Entm't, Inc.v. Next Big Sta r, Inc., 105 F . S upp. 2d at 185, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (listing a six­
factor test for secondary meaning). Even if a domain na me has been used for a good length 
oftime and without interruption ofuse, the wide use of the descriptive term by other Web 
sites weighs "against a fi nd ing ofsecondary meaning." DeGidio, 355 F.3d at 513. Further, 
even ifthe plaintiff h as spent millions ofdollars in advertisements, such information alone 
does not establ ish that the descriptive domain name has come to identifY the source . See 
BigStar Entm't, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (Although th e plaintiff had reportedly spent twelve 
million dollars in advertising, "the Court is u nable to determine supportably the extent to 
which plaintiff's advertising efforts have been effective in causing consum ers to associate 
'BIGSTAR' or 'BICSTAR.C O M' only with plaintiff."). 
119. See Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D .D .C. 1998) 
(noting that a domain name "can be tailored to be easily re membered, and even to convey 
info rmation about the user - it is often descriptive," that "the user can access a site by 
its descriptive name" and that "[i]f the name is properly registered and linked to an IP 
address, the user will be conveyed to the site he or she seeks"); see also 1-800 Contacts, 
Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F . Supp. 2d 467, 492 n .45 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[A) metatag is 
'buried code' that is not visible to Internet users, which is referenced by domain name 
sea rch engines or d irectories to determi ne whether a website corresponds to descriptive 
keywords entered into the search engine by a computer user. Those websites with meta tags 
corresponding to the requested keywords appear on the computer screen as the search 
engi ne's response." (citing Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't. Corp.; 174 F .3d 
1036, 1061-1062 n.23 (9th C ir. 1999)). 
120. See DeGidio, 355 F.3 d at 513 (noting that the plaintiff provid ed affidavits of 
three people who visited the <lawoffices.net> site and such evidence failed to "identifY 
the website with a particular sou rce ofservices" and that "[m Jere use ofa we bsite does not 
equal identification with a particular provider"). 
121. See Shade's lAnding, Inc. v. Williams, 76 F. Supp. 2d 983, 989 (D . Minn. 1999). 
122. See DeGidio, 355 F.3d at 513 (noting that the district court correctly re jected 
"as irrelevant the ran.kings by WebsMostLinked.com, a site that ranks websites based upon 
the number of other sites that link to them"). 
434 Trademark a nd Unfair Competition 
123. See id. (noting that the plaintiff did not submit consumer sutvey evidence for 
secondary meaning); BigStar Entm't, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (noting that the plaintiff did 
not conduct a consumer sutvey for secondary meaning). 
124. BigStar Entm't, 105 F. Supp . 2d at 203 (finding that the domain name 
<bigstar.com> has not achieved secondary meaning because "the Court is unable to 
determine supportably the extent to which plaintiff's advertising efforts have been effective 
in causing consumers to associate 'BIGSTAR' or 'BIGSTAR.COM' only with plaintiff'). 
125. Eglen v. Am. Online, Inc, 2003 WL 21508343, at*lO (S.D. Ind. June 12, 2003) 
(finding that <hometown.net> is merely descriptive and that the plaintiff failed to prove 
that it has secondary meaning). 
126. Shade's Landing, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 989. 
127. In analyzing whether the domain name <lawoffices.net> has acquired secondary 
meaning, the court applied a seven-factor test that included ( l ) direct consumer testimony; 
(2) consumer sutveys; (3) exclusivity, length and manner of use; (4) amount and manner 
of advertising; (5) amount of sales and number of customers; (6) established place in the 
market; and (7) proof of intentional copying. DeGidio, 355 F.3d at 513. The court held 
that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff failed to satisfy its heavy burden of proof. Id. 
128. See 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 2417 Tribeca Fitness, L.L.C., 277 F. Supp. 2d 
356, 362-363 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (analyzing the trademark "24 Hou r Fitness," finding that 
"the evidence that the mark 24 Hour Fitness has achieved secondary meaning in the 
minds of consumers to a significant degree as identifying Plaintiff as the particular source 
of goods and setvices offered under that rubric is far from compelling," and concluding 
that it is a descriptive trademark, and arguably a generic trademark, since there are 1.6 
million hits for the word "fitness" alone). 
129. This is a case where the owner of the domain name <cds.com> ·attempted to 
expand the scope of its original trademark "CDS," which was the initial trademark of its 
businesses. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that its domain name <cd.com> 
does not infringe upon the defendant's "CDS." The defenda nt claimed tha t "CDS" is 
for compact disc products and setvices. The court found that the defendant's assertion 
rendered its "CDS" trademark a "a term in common usage" and the mark was "invalid as 
being generic:" CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 15 F. Supp . 2d 986, 989- 990 (D. Or. 1998). 
130. See Gundersen, supra note 113, at 20-21. The first step, then, is to consider 
choosing a common or descriptive name versus choosing an arbitrary or fanciful one. The 
usual tradeoff exists between a descriptive name that needs little promotion to be effective, 
but is harder to register and defend- versus an arbitrary or fanciful name that needs more 
promotion, but is more defensible. Each approach represents a valid Internet busin_ess 
model, but each has different legal consequences - especially on the Internet 
Bl. See BigStar Entm't, Inc. v. Next BigStar, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 195(S.D.N.Y. 
2000); see also Am. Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 800 F.2d 306, 306 (2d Gir. 
1986). 
132. See generally Surgicenters ofAm., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 
1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[A] 'generic word' cannot be validly registered as a trademark 
even if there is proof of secondary meaning."). 
133. See generally Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 (1st Cir. 
1980) ("No amount of purported proof that a generic term has acquired secondary mean­
ing associating it with a particular prod ucer can transform that term into a registrable 
trademark.");CES Publ'g Corp. v. St.,Regis Publ'ns Inc., 531 F.2d 11, l3 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(rejecti ng the district court's fi nding that a generic term may become a trademark if it 
435 Taxing Trademarks and Domain Names 
acquires secondary meaning, and reiterating the rule that generic tem1s cannot attain 
trademark status in any circumstance) . 
134. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'! Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. Ill, 122 (1938) (stating that 
"(s]ha ring in the goodwill of an article unprotected by . .. trade-mark is the exercise of 
a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise which the consuming public is deeply 
interested"). 
135. Treas. Reg. § l.l97- 2(b)(10)(i). 
136. ld. 
137. Id. (emphasis added). 
138. Annette Nell en, Domain Names and Other Intangibles for Internet Business, 14 
J. Tax'n F. Inst. 31, 34 (2001). 
139. E-mail from David L. Cameron, Associate Director, Tax Program, and Senior 
Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law, to Jeffrey A. Maine, Professor of Law, 
University of Maine School of Law, Qan. 23, 2004) (on file with authors). 
140. Treas. Reg.§ 1.197- 2(b)(l0). 
141. 15 u.s.c. § 1127 (2004). 
142. See Bel!South Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) ("A generic term can not function as an indication of source," i.e., "cannot inform 
the public that the product has a particular source."}; In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
6 Smith, Inc., 828 F.Zd 1567, 1569-1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating tha t gene ric marks 
are incapable of indicating a particular source of goods or services, and cannot be regis­
tered as trademarks; doing so "would grant the owner of the mark a monopoly, since a 
competitor could not describe his goods as what they are" (citi ng CES Publ'g Corp. v. St . 
Regis Publ'ns Inc., 531 F.Zd 11, l3 (2d Cir. 1975))). Even the fact that the public may 
associate a generic term with a particular source will not necessarily preClude a finding of 
"genericness." See, e.g., E. Air Lines, Inc. v. N.Y. Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
143. The primary function of a trademark is to identify and distinguish the goods or 
services of one source from those sold by all others, although this may be accomplished 
anonymously. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 12.01 (1] (3d ed. l992);see Merrill Lynch, 828 F.Zd at 1569 ("Generic terms, by definition 
incapable of indicating source, are the antithesis of trade marks, and can never attain 
trademark status."). The Lanham Act precludes registration on the principal .register of 
a mark that "when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely 
descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them ." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(l) (2004). A 
generic term falls within this prohibition because "[t]he gene ric name of a thing is in fact 
the ultimate in descriptiveness." H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 
782 F.2d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
144. Treas. Reg.§ 1.197-Z(b)(lO)(i). 
145. "Under the principle ofe;usdem generis, when a gene ral term follows a specific 
one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with 
specific enumeration." Norfolk 6 W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 
117, 129 (1991). 
146. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 106 (2001), is illustrative of 
the maxim ejusdem generis. There, the Court interpreted that" 'any other class ofworkers 
engaged in ... commerce' constitutes a residual phrase, fol1owing, in the same sentence, 
explicit reference to 'seamen' and 'railroad employees.' The wording tlms calls for appli­
cation of the maxim ejusdem generis, under which the residual clause should be read to 
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give effect to the terms 'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' and should be controlled and 
defined by reference to those terms." Id. (citation omitted). 
147. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Allayd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (warns against 
attributing to a generic term "a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompa­
nying words, thus giving 'unintended breadth to the Acts ofCongress'" (quoting Jarecki v. 
G.D. Searle 6 Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961))). 
148. I.R.C. § l97(d)(l)(A). 
149. Treas. Reg. § l.l97-2(b)(l). 
150. See Brookfield Commc'ns, lnc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 
(9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that each domain name is associated with a webpage and is 
unique in that there are no identical domain names). 
151. See CarefirstofMd., Inc. v. CarefirstPregnancyCtrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 394 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (noting that the plaintiff registered a number of domain names that contain 
"carefirst" to direct Internet traffic to its Web site); Nat'[ A-1 Adver., Inc. v. Network 
Solutions, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156, 177 (D.N.H. 2000) (finding thatthe plaintiff used 
certain domain names to generate commercial web traffic to their sites). 
152. See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 
691 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that upon entering a domain name into the web browser, the 
corresponding Web site's "homepage" wil1 appear on the computer screen). 
15 3. See id. ("A specific website is most easily located by entering its domain name 
into the browser."); see, e.g., PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 
389, 408 (S.D.N .Y. 1999) (concluding that a domain name is "simply a routing instruction 
that helps computers find each other"). The actual networking, however, is done through 
the Internet Protocol numbers that correspond with domain names for the ease ofhi.tman 
users. See id.: 
[T]here does not appear to be a requirement that a computer user wishing to 
establish an Internet site have a domain name at all . This is because domain 
names serve the sole purpose of making it easier for users to navigate the Internet; 
the real networ~ing is done through the IP numbers. 
154. Ifa Web user does not know the domain name, the user may then use an Internet 
search engine. "When a keyword is entered, the search engine processes it to generate a 
(sometimes long) list of Web pages (ideally relating to the entered keyword)." Interactive 
Prods., 326 F. 3d at 691. 
15 5. This linkage is severed if there is a third party who registered a misspelled 
version of the domain name. See Ballistic Prods., Inc. v. Precision Reloading, Ina., 2003 
WL 21 754816, at"'5 (D. Minn. July 28, 2003) (holding that irreparable harm exists ir1 a 
case where the defendant registered misspelled domain names and directed Internet traffic 
from the plaintiff's Web site to defendant's Web site). Defendant's action caused consumer 
confusion, leading them to falsely believe that the plaintiff does not operate a Web site. 
Id. Thus, the plaintiff "can never know how much traffic was lost, or how much faster the 
traffic would have grown" absent defendants' registration of the misspelled domain names. 
Id. (quoting Shields v. Zucarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634,641 (E.D . Pa. 2000)). 
156. See Interactive Prods., 326 F.3d at 691 ("A website's dqmain name (e.g., 
a2zsolutions.com) signifies its source of origin and is, therefo re, an important signal to 
Internet users who are seeking to l.ocate web resources."). Due to its source identifying 
capacity, many courts have held that the use of ~mother's trademark within the domain 
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name of a Web site can constitute a trademark violation. Id. See generally Shields v. 
Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court's ruling in favor 
of the trademark owner in a case where the defendant registered domain names that in­
corporated the protected trademark to divert Internet traffic from the trademark owner's 
Web site to the defendant's Web site, causing irreparable harm to the trademark). 
157. See Elise Ackerman, Low-tech Entrepreneurs Stake Claim to Online Domains, 
San Diego Union-T rib., Jan. 24, 2000, at Cl (stating that Bank of America paid three 
million dollars for <loans.com>, an undeveloped domain name). 
158. See Costly 'Loans' for Bank ofAmerica, Computers Today, May 31, 2000, at l06 
(reporting that Bank ofAmerica purchased the domain name <loans.com> because "it's 
a unique and valuable name, especially in connection with what [Bank of America does] 
which is make loans to individuals and businesses"). 
159. See Daniel Joelson, Banks Square OffOver Internet Domain Names, Bank Tech. 
News, Nov. 22, 2000, at I (stating that the acquisition of the domain name <l.oans.com> 
for three million dollars is "less startling whe n one considers that the site was receiving 
3,000 to 4,000 hits per day at the time"); Patrick Larkin, Profi.t.com: P6G Sells 'Net 
Names, Cincinnati Post, Aug. 30, 2000, at 6B (reporting that Bank ofAmerica paid three 
million dollars for <loans.com>, "a nonexistent site that was getting 3,000 to 4,000 hits 
a day"). 
160. See ge nerally Larkin, supra note 159 (listing generic domain names sold or being 
offered for sales at high prices). 
161. See Warren Agin, Workouts and Bankruptcy in the cCommerce Economy, 661 
PLI/Fifth Annual Internet Law Inst. 947, 990 (2001) (stating that "a domain name rep­
resents goodwill because the traffic generated by a website- the nu mber of people who 
visit the website and view the content provided there-and consequently the val ue of 
that website depend on the domain name" and that "[w]hen the domain name changes, 
the volume of traffic to the website will drop, as visitors are no longer able to locate the 
website"). 
162. See Dorerv. Abel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999) (acknowledging that 
there are generic domains that are "extremely valuable to Internet entrepreneurs" because 
they can be "freely transferred apart from thei r content"). 
163. See generally Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555­
556 (1993) ("Although the definition of goodwill has taken different forms over the years, 
the shorthand description of good-will as 'the expectancy of continued patronage' provides 
a useful label with which to identify the total of all the imponderable qualities that attrac t 
customers to the business."). 
164. See Mason Miller, Note, Technoliability: Corporate Websites, Hyperlinks, and 
Rule lO(b)-5, 58 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 367, 381 (2003) (noting that the number of visitors 
to a Web site de termines the "value" of the Web site). 
165. See John E. Cummerford, Hyperlinking and Framing: Recent Developments and 
Trends, 644 PLI/Pat 293, 295 (200l) ("What drives visitors to websites is content- whethe r 
it's sports scores, music downloads or pornography-that's the thing that makes people 
show up, stay there, and come back another day."); Jennifer Gordon, For Web Success: 
Content, Content, Content, Marketing for Law., Nov. 2000, at 7 (stating that keeping 
online conte nt fresh will encourage traffic). 
166. Ryan L. Blaine, Comment, Election Law and the Internet: How Should the FEC 
Manage New Technology?, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 697, 725 (2003) ("Large Internet corporations 
also use radio and television advertisements to increase the traffic to their Web sites."); 
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Kristen M. Beystehner, Note, See Ya Later, Gator: Assessing Whether Placing Pop-Up 
Advertisements on Another Company's Website Violates Trademark Law, II J. Intell. Prop. 
L. 87, 96-99 (2003) (discussing different types of ooJine advertisements employed by Web 
sites to increase traffic to their sites); Allison Roarty, Note, Link Liability: The Argument 
for Inline Links and Frames as Infringement$ ofthe Copyright Display Right, 68 Fordham 
L. Rev. lOll, 1016 (1999) (noting that Web site owners utilize links to increase traffic to 
their Web sites). 
167. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 ("[l]f the only value that comes from transfer of 
the domain name is from the value added by the user, it is inappropriate to consider that 
[the domain name] is an element subject to execution."). 
168. Treas. Reg.§ l.167(a)-3. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. § l.l67(a)-l(b). 
171. CCH Tax and Accounting, Domain Names-What You Must Know About Their 
Tax Treatment, E-Commerce Tax Alert J, 11 0 (Dec. 2000), http: //tax.cchgro up.com/ 
ecornlarchive/2000/l200/200.h tm (citation omitted). 
172. Treas. Reg.§ l.l67(a)-l(b) (stating that a taxpayer may establish the useful life 
of eligible property for depreciation purposes based upon his own experiences with similar 
properly}. 
173. Jd. (statingthat if a taxpayer's experience is inadequate, the taxpayer may establish 
useful life based on ge neral industry standards). 
174. The regulations provide that the useful life of intellectual property is not neces­
sarily the statutory legal life of the asset, but rather is the period over which the asset may 
reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his or her trade or business or in the 
production of income. Id. § 1.167(a)-l(b). 
175. See, e.g., Comm'rv. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1974) (explaining the 
pwpose of the cost recovery system). 
J76. Treas. Reg.§ l.l67(a)-3 (b). 
177. Id. § l.l67(a)-3(b)(3) (providing that the basis of the intangible asset, without 
regard to salvage value, is amortized ratably over the fifteen-year amortization period 
begin ning on the first day of the month in which the intangible asset is placed in service 
by the taxpayer). 
178. For a similar example, see David E. Hardesty, Taxation of Intern et Domain 
Names - Can They Be Shoehorned Into tlte 15-Year Amortization Rules?, 93 J. Tax'n 367, 
370 (Dec. 2000). 
179. Id. 
180. Revenue Procedure 2000--50 defines software as "any program or routine (that is, 
any sequence of machine-readable code) that is designed to cause a computer to perform 
a desired function or set of functions .... " Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601. Under 
such a definition, designing a Web site with HTML language is creating "software." 
181. For possible tax treatment ofWeb site expenditures, see Maine & Nguyen, supra 
note 4, at 201-207. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
